This report compares the performance of two algorithms in correlating observations from multiple sensors. This correlation problem can be treated as an assignment problem in operations research, with assignment costs being equal to the sufficient statistic of the generalized likelihood ratio test. In sensor-to-sensor correlation, the main concern is a one-to-one solution in which targets from one sensor are matched in an optimal manner with targets from the other sensor. This corresponds to a classical assignment problem that is often solved using Munkres' algorithm. In target object mapping, concern shifts to correctly associating a subset of high-value targets between sensors. We hypothesize that this goal could be better attained by allowing for a many-to-one solution and propose the use of a modified auction algorithm to solve this generalized assignment problem. Results of Monte Carlo simulations of such situations are analyzed to compare the performance of the two solution methods.
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INTRODUCTION
Several specific problems arise in target tracking applications. One problem is the case in which multiple sensors simultaneously track a number of targets, often referred to as multiple target tracking. Though multiple target tracking has other problem areas, we will specifically discuss the correlation of measurements from several sensors associated with the same target
The usual assumption in sensor-to-sensor correlation problems is that the locations of the targets are uncorrelated. In other words, it is assumed that there is a unique one-to-one association between targets observed by both sensors, and the payoff for correctly assigning, or correlating, each target is the same. In many practical tracking problems these assumptions do not hold. For example, when real sensor resolution effects are considered, two objects that are tracked as separate targets by one sensor may be unresolved and correspond to a single track file in the other sensor. In this case, the assumption of a one-to-one correspondence between tracks is violated. Another example occurs when tracking targets in clutter or debris. Here the payoff for correlating high-value targets such as missiles or aircraft is much greater than for correctly correlating extraneous debris tracks.
A set of sensor tracks and associated target identifications is known as a target object mapping. Target object mapping is a special case of the sensor-to-sensor correlation problem in which a selected subset of high-value targets is correlated between sensors. It is often more important to associate the high-value target observed by sensor 1 with the high-value target observed by sensor 2, even if additional targets observed by sensor two are associated with that sensor-one target The focus of this paper will be to consider new algorithms that efficiently solve some target object mapping problems and compare the new algorithms to more conventional algorithms for sensor-to-sensor correlation.
For the case of unique one-to-one target association, it has been shown that the sensor-to-sensor correlation problem is the same as the classical assignment problem in operations research [1] [2] [3] . The costs (or performance ratings) used for association can be shown to be the sufficient statistic of the multiple hypothesis generalized likelihood ratio test [1] . Under the correct hypothesis for Gaussian uncertainty models, the sufficient statistic follows the chi-square distribution. The classical assignment problem has customarily been solved using Munkres' algorithm [3] , although more efficient algorithms have been proposed to reduce computation times for problems of large dimension [4] .
In this work, target object mapping is treated as a generalized assignment problem in which multiple assignments are allowed. The targets are assigned to minimize the total weighted distance between tracks of the two sensors. The distance measure is based on a Gaussian uncertainty model. The auction algorithm as developed by Bertsekas [5] will be used to solve the generalized assignment problem.
In Section 2, we derive a correlation cost model from a generalized likelihood ratio test as in [1] . In Section 3, we define the classical and generalized assignment problems. In Section 4, we introduce our solution methods, Munkres' algorithm and the auction algorithm. In Section 5, we formulate a target object mapping problem and develop a basis for simulation. Finally, in Section 6, we use Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate six performance measures. It can be assumed that all x,-and y • are referred to the same Cartesian coordinate system, even though sensors 1 and 2 are not required to be identical. If the measurements are not of the same coordinate system, a required transformation can be defined to satisfy the above assumption. Let the covariance of the measurement noise for sensors 1 and 2 be represented by P^ and £ -. , respectively. This can be thought of as the uncertainty of measurement i from sensor 1 and j from sensor 2.
Let H k denote the hypothesis that the same target, k, has generated measurements. Note that there are a total of N possible hypotheses. Let z represent the true measurement vector corresponding to H k . Then the generalized likelihood ratio test requires the following decision function [6] :
This decision function is obtained using the maximum likelihood estimate of z; that is, the z satisfying
The decision function is then found by substituting z into Equation 1. Equations 1 and 2 form the sufficient statistic for correlation measurements from multiple sensors.
Assume that measurement noise is independent between sensors and follows a Gaussian density function with zero mean. Further assume the covariance for sensor 1 is identically equal to P for all observations i and the covariance for sensor 2 is identically equal to L for all observations j. Then the decision function from Equation 1 becomes
where
The z in Equation 4 is the maximum likelihood estimate of z assuming that all x i , y • . are uncorrelated.
Referring to Equation 4 for z, the decision function in Equation 3 can be simplified as follows. First note that
This follows from direct substitution. From this, one can see the following:
Similarly, one can arrive at
Finally, substituting 
This value can be interpreted as a weighted distance measure between observations x,-and y y . If observations x ( -and y ; do result from the same target, then J« follows a chi-square distribution, with degrees of freedom equal to the observation vector size [7] . If x i and y y do not result from the same target, (x, -yj) is not zero mean. In this case, l-has a higher probability of achieving values significantly larger than that of a chi-square random variable. This statistical realization allows the use of chi-square statistics in selecting a threshold to prescreen l i} 's. We will see that this can be used in a preliminary manner to effectively eliminate l v 's mat indicate that x-t and y • should not be associated.
To restate the problem, suppose one would like to decide which x t should be correlated with a particular y •. In other words, for a particular observation from sensor 2, which observation from sensor 1 is most likely to have originated from the same target? For a fixed j, this generalized multiple hypothesis testing procedure will select that x-that satisfies mm l u for a given; .
(10) (i=l,...,A0
,J This value of x i is the best match to target j independent of all other target matches. In the next section we will consider two assignment problems that correspond to a global match of targets that minimizes the sum of / • • over all indices i and j.
ASSIGNMENT PROBLEMS
A commonly used example of an assignment problem is the instance in which one has m people and n jobs, where m does not necessarily equal n. There is a certain cost (or benefit), c • •, of assigning person i to job j. Which persons should be assigned to which jobs to ensure that the total assignment cost is minimal (or that benefits are maximal)? Two possible solutions to this problem are a one-to-one assignment, in which each person is assigned to work on exactly one job, and a many-to-one assignment, in which each person may work on more than one job.
Consider the assignment problem cost matrix shown in Table 1 . Recall that l^ is the sufficient statistic associated with correlating observation i from sensor 1 with observation j from sensor 2, as derived in Equation 9. We can treat / • • as the cost, c • , of associating x i and y • .
CLASSICAL ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
In the classical assignment problem, /-; would represent the cost (or benefit) of assigning person i to work on the / job. The optimum assignment is that which can minimize the total assignment costs, subject to the constraint that each person be assigned to exactly one job:
7=1
(ID where fy are binary variables that indicate whether person i is assigned to job ;'. The problem denned in Equation 11 assumes that there are an equal number of jobs and people, i.e., m = n = N, and yields a one-to-one assignment An obvious but unwieldy way of treating this problem is to enumerate all possible assignment sets and then select the one that yields the minimum sum. This approach requires N\ trials. A well-known method, the Hungarian algorithm, requires substantially fewer operations to reach an optimal solution. An implementation of the Hungarian algorithm was developed by Munkres [3] , which requires 0{N) operations. For large N, this represents a significant savings.
The case that m * n is the generalized assignment problem. To a certain degree, this can still be considered and treated as a classical assignment problem. Without loss of generality, consider the case in which m < n, i.e., there are more jobs than people. The objective function in Equation 11 remains the same, but the constraint set is slightly modified to require that each person may only be assigned once, so that there is still a one-to-one assignment Thus there will be (n -m) jobs that will remain unassigned.
Munkres' algorithm can be modified slightly to solve this more general assignment problem. It provides an optimal solution, assuming the above constraints, and requires 0(m ) operations. This has already been implemented [8] , and the details will not be included in this report Currently, Munkres' algorithm is the method that is most often used to solve sensor-to-sensor correlation problems [9] .
MULTIASSIGNMENT PROBLEM
An alternative way of considering the generalized assignment problem, in which there are an unequal number of people and jobs, is the multiassignment problem. The objective function remains the same, and each job will only be assigned to one persoa However, each job will be assigned to some person, so each person may have more than one job assignment (each job must be done): 
This version of the problem yields a many-to-one assignment A good solution to this problem, known as the auction algorithm, is found in [5] .
The auction algorithm can be used to solve all three versions of the assignment problem using the same techniques, as long as m and n are specified. The user may extract either a one-to-one solution or a many-to-one solution. If the association costs are integral, the solution provided by auction is optimal. The auction algorithm also solves a large problem with significantly smaller computational complexity,
SOLUTION METHODS
MUNKRES'ALGORITHM
The Munkres* algorithm itself will not be discussed in detail in this report. An existing FORTRAN implementation that had been modified to solve the classical assignment problem for m < n was used [8] . One need only provide m and n, the number of observations for each sensor, and the calculated correlation costs. Figure 2 is given here as the most basic representation of Munkres' algorithm. A = Assignment Problem Cost Matrix, as in Table 1 Mark any 0 entries as 0* and cover 0* columns 
AUCTION ALGORITHM
As the name implies, the auction algorithm can be described in terms of an auction. Most of the intuition provided in the following section is taken from [5] . It is repeated here with minor alterations in notation and terminology to facilitate better understanding of the initialization values and modifications specific to this application. Define a price vector p-, which is the dual variable associated with the j constraint of the first set of constraints in Equation 13. This can be thought of as the price that must be paid for job j. Similarly, define a profit vector rc,, which is the dual variable associated with the i h constraint of the second set of constraints in Equation 13. This represents the profit that person i will receive for any job. Denote the dual variable associated with the last constraint in Equation 13 as X, the maximal initial person profit For the sake of computational convergence, define a constraint e, which represents the minimum bid increase. This ensures that bidding will always increase the price of a job. This bid increase must be large enough to provide fast, finite convergence, and small enough to guarantee optimality. It has been proven that for integer costs e < \/m is sufficient to guarantee optimality [5, 10] . For the purposes of this paper however, real costs were used. In this case, it is necessary to scale the real costs in such a way that they are equivalently integral. This is equivalent to scaling merely the minimum bid increase, which requires less computation. In this manner, e < 0.0001 /m was found to be sufficient to guarantee optimality for the real costs used in this application.
Assignment using the auction algorithm requires two steps. The first step is the forward auction, where each job is assigned to exactly one person. The forward auction will provide the same one-to-one solution provided by Munkres* algorithm. The second step is the reverse auction, where the remaining n-m unassigned jobs will be appropriately assigned, so that each person may have more than one job to do. Each of the forward and reverse auction steps is comprised of a bidding phase followed by an assignment phase.
Before the auction algorithm can commence, a brief initialization is required. The initial values described are those that are used in this particular application. Other initial values can be used, with feasible ranges described in [10] . At any stage of the auction, there will be an assignment set S, indicating which person has been assigned to which job. The initial assignment set is trivially chosen as the empty assignment. The price vector p is initially set to 0 for all jobs. Using the formulation of the dual problem, the initial profit vector can then be set to
;'
Finally, using the definition of the maximal initial person profit, X is initialized as X = "fie,. .
The forward auction is fairly straightforward. In the bidding phase, unassigned persons i will submit "bids" for their "favorite" job j i , as follows. The favorite job j i of person j is that which offers maximum value:
;,. If there is no other job left to assign, w, is set to -10000 to simulate negative infinity. Finally, the bid person i will submit for job ;',-is calculated by:
The assignment phase for the forward auction considers each job j that received a bid during the most recent bidding phase. The set of people who submitted bids for job j is represented by P(J). At this point, the price of job j is increased to the highest bid it received, as calculated in Equation 19:
If j were previously assigned to some i" , then f becomes unassigned, and j is now assigned to the person i • who submitted the winning bid. This forward auction is continued until all persons i are assigned to some job j i .
If there were a tie for person i, the best value offered by any job other than ;'•, w i would be the same as v-, which would mean the bid in Equation 19 would become
and thus the bid is increased by the minimum bid increase, e.
The reverse auction starts with some assignment set S in which each person is assigned to a distinct job. In other words, the reverse auction starts with the S provided by the forward auction. It follows similarly to the forward auction, but it must contain a mechanism that distinguishes when a job can be added to a person's existing assignment as opposed to when that job displaces the existing assignment, thus unassigning any currently assigned jobs.
The bidding phase involves all jobs ; that are unassigned under the assignment set 5. Job j selects its "favorite" person, i •, as that which offers maximal value ij = arg "• {-/<,-*,} . 
As in the forward auction, if i-is the only person left to consider, <Oj is set to -10000, or negative infinity. The multiassignment indicator, or bid, is set as:
•/ * '
In the assignment phase, job j is assigned to person ij, and the price and profit vectors are updated: At the end of the forward auction, an optimal one-to-one assignment is given, equivalent to the optimal assignment obtained by Munkres' algorithm. If a one-to-one assignment were sought, the solution is provided from the forward auction alone. At the end of the reverse auction, all jobs j are assigned to some person i, and each person i may have more than one job assignment.
It is relevant to discuss the use of the chi-square statistic at this point If the association cost of job ; to all persons i • l,...,m exceeds the appropriate chi-squared statistic, then job j is labeled as assigned to no person during the initialization. This excludes it from being considered in multiassignment in the reverse auction algorithm, while being consistent with the idea of associating measurements that are most likely to have originated from the same target. If there are (n -m + k) such jobs j that exceed the chi-squared statistic for all persons, k of these jobs will be assigned during the forward auction, because each person must be assigned some job.
TARGET OBJECT MAPPING SIMULATION
A Monte Carlo simulation of the target object mapping problem was used to compare the two algorithms. Two sensors simultaneously track a set of m targets. The sensors' measurement errors are modeled as zero mean Gaussian, with sensor l's error variance denoted by a 2 and the sensor 2's error variance denoted by a 2 .
A set of m targets is randomly drawn from a two-dimensional uniform [0,1] distribution. These m targets are assumed to be observed by both sensors, and the appropriate random Gaussian noise is added for the sensor measurement value. A set of (n -m) extraneous targets are then randomly drawn, also from a two-dimensional uniform [0,1] distribution, that are only observed by sensor 2. The appropriate random Gaussian noise is also added to these targets to provide for sensor 2's extraneous measurements.
The association costs, /«, are calculated as in Equation 9 . A chi-square threshold corresponding to a 93% confidence level was used to screen out unlikely matches. If l» for observation j is greater than this value for all observations i = 1 ,...,m, observation j can be considered as one of the extraneous observations and automatically discarded from consideration for multiassignment in the reverse auction.
Once the association costs are calculated, the assignment problem is solved two ways: one solution is obtained by Munkres' algorithm; the other is obtained using the auction algorithm.
RESULTS
Experiments of such Monte Carlo simulations were conducted using four slightly different test sets. Within each test set, 11 separate runs consisting of 1000 simulations each were conducted (see Figure 4) . This was to demonstrate the difference in the results as the normalized error, a = (Oj + a 2 2 ) , ranged from 0.001,0.1,..., 1.0. The case in which error is equal to 0.001 approximates the case in which error is equal to zero, or when the measurements are very precise. The other extreme, when error is equal to 1.0, is the case in which the sensors are not providing accurate readings at all. The most important comparisons occur when the error is between 0.2 and 0.4, because, as will be seen, this is when correlation accuracy drastically decreases. When the error variance for sensor 2 is much less than that for sensor 1, the error variance for sensor 2 is set to 0.001. An initial set of experiments evaluated the performance of both algorithms for the one-to-one correlation problem. For such sets, m = n, and the auction algorithm terminates at the end of the forward auction because all persons and all jobs are assigned. These results show that both methods provided the same one-to-one solutions, because both solved the case optimally for the calculated correlation costs. The next set of experiments considered unequal numbers of observations for the two sensors. These test sets are summarized in Table 2 . The results shown below demonstrate results for test set 1, but these results can be extended to include the other test sets. There are m = 5 observations from sensor 1 (SI) and n = 10 observations from sensor 2 (S2). Six performance measures were considered important for this case (see Table 3 ). The results of each are plotted versus the normalized variance error, a. The probability of perfect assignment is a sensor-to-sensor correlation measurement. This tells us how often each of the SI observations was assigned to the S2 observation that originated from the same target, for each of the five targets. In the case of the auction algorithm, a multiassignment was considered perfect if the correct S2 observation was among those assigned to the corresponding S1 observation for each of the five targets. As can be seen from Figure 5 , the auction algorithm offered significant improvement over Munkres' algorithm in perfect assignment At covariance values of 0.2 through 0.4, there is as much as a 30% improvement.
The rest of the performance measures concentrate on the more specific target object mapping problem. In these, we are concerned most specifically with one particular target, which is referred to as the prime target. For the sake of simplicity, we assume the prime target is the first target The following graphs depict the accuracy of the correlation of the measurements for this specific target. The probability of prime target correlation measures how often the SI prime target observation and the S2 prime target observation were correcdy assigned. For the multiassignment, it is enough that the S2 prime target observation is among those assigned to the SI prime target observation. As is seen in Figure 6 , the auction algorithm again offers significant improvement over Munkres' algorithm. At the most critical points, where covariance is between 0.2 and 0.4, it offers a 10% to 20% improvement in prime target correlation.
The number of prime target assignments measures how allowing the multiassignment benefited in finding the correct prime target assignment. The baseline is the number of times, over 1000 simulations, Munkres' algorithm correctly associated the SI prime target observation and the S2 prime target observation. This is compared to the number of times the auction algorithm provided the correct assignment as a one-to-one solution. It is also compared to the number of times the auction algorithm provided the correct assignment in a k -to-one assignment (multiassignment), where k can be 2, 3,4, 5, or 6. The average assignment cost of the prime target was compared. For Munkres' algorithm, this was merely the correlation cost /j of the SI prime target observation, and the S2 observation ;* assigned to it. These values were summed over the 1000 simulations, and then the average was taken. For the auction algorithm, the distinct minimum and maximum SI prime target assignment costs for each of the 1000 simulations were taken as a baseline. It is intuitively obvious that the prime target assignment costs are bounded below by zero and above by the chi-square threshold. Finding the average assignment cost was a multistep process. In each simulation, the average of the correlation costs /. for all S2 observations j assigned to the SI prime target observation was found. These averages were summed over the 1000 simulations, and the overall average was then calculated. It can be seen from Figure 8 that the auction algorithm has a slightly larger average assignment cost for the prime target than Munkres' algorithm. This is most likely due to allowing several assignments, which are likely to have slightly larger assignment costs than the single optimum assignment
There were several statistics that were compared to demonstrate the efficiency of the auction algorithm. The average number of iterations for the forward and reverse auction iterations was calculated simply to show that at any given time, the auction algorithm does not require a large number of iterations. More specifically, Figure 9 shows that, on average, there are never more than five forward auction iterations, and rarely more than two reverse auction iterations. The number of prime target swaps displays how often the assignment for the prime target at the end of the forward auction is not included in the prime target assignment at the end of the reverse auction. A prime target swap can mean that the SI prime target and the S2 prime target were correctly assigned at the end of the forward auction, and then not assigned at the end of the reverse auction. It is equally likely that the reverse is true, i.e., that the SI prime target and the S2 prime target were not assigned at the end of the forward auction and then were correctly assigned at the end of the reverse auction. Figure 10 shows that such swaps occur, at worst, in about 10% of the simulations. The performance measures become a little trickier if it is important to assign the prime target measurement from one sensor to only one measurement of the other sensor. This could happen, for example, in case three of our test sets. This would correspond to a situation in which S2 obviously has a larger error variance and more measurements than SI. The primary concern in this scenario is to associate the prime target measurement of SI to only the S2 measurement that is most likely to correspond to the prime target. Obviously, Munkres' algorithm forces such a one-to-one assignment, so the Munkres' performance measures remain the same. The performance measure of interest is the probability of prime target correlation. For the auction algorithm, this can be defined by considering a prime target assignment as correct only if the SI prime target is the only observation correlated with the S2 prime target. Both performance measures are represented in Figure 11 . The prime target accuracy for the auction algorithm is represented by the bar that indicates the number of times the auction algorithm provided the correct prime target assignment as a one-to-one assignment. The remaining auction results are shown for comparison. For such a definition of prime target correlation, Munkies' algorithm outperforms the auction algorithms significantly, especially when the covariance is between 0.2 and 0.4. However, in this case, one could simply extract the one-to-one solution from the forward auction if one were not interested in allowing multiassignments.
The remaining performance measures can be conducted in the same manner for all test sets, resulting in similar conclusions. The average prime target assignment costs showed similar patterns, being bounded above by the chi-square statistic and below by zero, with the average auction cost slightly greater than the average Munkres' cost. The average number of forward auction iterations approached six; the average number of reverse auction iterations rarely exceeded two. The number of prime target assignment swaps was, in the worst case, never more than 12%.
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CONCLUSIONS
This report set out to explore the use of the auction algorithm in an application of the assignment problem: the target object mapping problem. More specifically, a comparison of the performance of the auction algorithm for generalized assignment and Munkres' algorithm for one-to-one assignment was conducted. This was done in four test sets, the results of which were compared using various performance measures in an attempt to show the problem from multiple angles.
The auction algorithm requires considerably fewer computations. The computational complexity of the auction algorithm is only O(nmlogm), as compared to Munkres' algorithm, which has a computational complexity of 0(m ). (However, in situations that are realistically considered in target object mapping, computational complexity is not a factor, because measurement sets are typically small enough where such run-times would be negligible.) The fast, finite completion of the auction algorithm was further quantified by showing that the average number of total auction iterations never exceeded eight iterations throughout the experiments.
The auction algorithm is significantly more flexible then Munkres' algorithm. If one is concerned with the one-to-one assignment provided by Munkres', it is simple to extract this solution from the final forward auction assignment set However, if one is concerned with a target object map, the multi assignment allowed by the reverse auction provides significantly better prime target solutions. This was demonstrated through the use of two performance measures: the probability of perfect assignment in a sensor-to-sensor correlation experiment, and the probability of prime target correlation in target object mapping. As covariance increased, the variability between the Munkres' prime target solution and the auction prime target solution also increased, with as much as a 12% variability for final prime target assignments.
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